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THE INTERPLAY OF PROBATE ASSETS AND
NONPROBATE ASSETS IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF A DECEDENT'S ESTATE
James J. Carroll*
With increasing frequency, nontestamentary devices are be-
ing employed as substitutes for a will in contemporary estate
plans. The author explores the interplay of probate and non-
probate assets in two important areas: the surviving spouse's
interest, and the apportionment of the federal estate tax. He
suggests various approaches that the legislature and courts
might adopt in formulating a definitive solution to these current
probate problems.
The past century has witnessed significant changes in not only
the character of the property comprising a decedent's estate, but
also the mode by which property is transferred from one genera-
tion to the next. In the agrarian society of the nineteenth century,
the primary emphasis of probate law was on the devolution of real
estate, then the foundation of the American economy and the
principal source of wealth. As society developed to the present
highly industrialized and urbanized corporate structure, real es-
tate was displaced from its exalted position in the economic
structure and was replaced by intangible personal property, the
life blood of modern capitalism. Accordingly, the transmission of
intangible personal property has become the focal point of most
contemporary estate plans.
This shift in emphasis from real property to intangible personal
property has been accompanied by a related phenomenon in the
design of estate plans: a marked decline in the reliance on a will
as the primary vehicle to dispose of one's estate.' With increasing
frequency, a variety of nontestamentary devices have been em-
* Associate, Sidley & Austin. Member of the Illinois Bar.
1. The decline in the use of a will as the primary estate planning tool is due in large
part to the public's attitude toward probate proceedings.
Rightly, or wrongly, the public seems to believe that such mandatory court
proceedings generate unnecessary expense and delay in the transmission of the
average estate at death. As a result, myriad techniques have developed to avoid
probate.
Zartman, Uniform Probate Code-Policies and Prospects, 61 ILL. B.J. 428, 429 (1973).
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ployed as substitutes for a will in the transmission of property.
Those devices most widely used are inter vivos trusts, joint ten-
ancy ownership of assets, life insurance policies, joint and survi-
vor annuities, employee benefit plans, "Totten trust" savings
accounts, and "payable on death" accounts and bonds.2 Thus,
the typical decedent's estate, today, is composed of both probate
assets, i.e., property which passes under his will or by intestacy,
and nonprobate assets, i.e., property which passes by contract, by
operation of law, or under the provisions of a trust or other non-
testamentary device outside the jurisdiction of a probate court.
The increasing emphasis on nonprobate assets in a decedent's
estate may best be illustrated by a few telling statistics. From
1940 to 1973 the aggregate amount of life insurance in force in-
creased almost sixteenfold, from approximately 115 billion to
1.8 trillion dollars.3 During the same period the average life in-
surance coverage per family rose sharply from $2,700 to $24,400.1
This surge in the use of life insurance can be explained partially
by the preferred status afforded it under federal income tax
laws,5 but its increased use is primarily attributable to changing
attitudes about its role as an asset of one's estate. Life insurance
is no longer viewed simply as the source of one's burial expenses,
but rather as a means of guaranteeing a continuing source of in-
come to one's family and of providing liquidity to one's estate.
Death benefits under employee benefit plans have also become
an important nonprobate asset, primarily because of the favor-
able federal estate and income tax treatment of such benefits.'
During the period of 1940 to 1970 the coffers of private employee
2. Although not generally regarded as a means of transmitting wealth, the payment of
survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act is also in substance a nontestamentary
disposition of property. The survivor, at least in theory, is receiving the lifetime contribu-
tions of the decedent. The amount of survivor's benefits has greatly increased over recent
years. From 1950 to 1971, for example, the average monthly benefit of widows and widow-
ers rose from $36.54 to $113.17. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 286, table 464 (1972).
3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 468, table 762
(1974).
4. Id.
5. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 101(a) excluding life insurance proceeds from the
definition of gross income and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 79 excluding the premium paid
by an employer up to $50,000 of group term life insurance on his employee's life from the
employee's gross income.
6. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2039(c) which exempts from federal estate taxation
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benefit trusts swelled from 2.4 to 137.1 million dollars,7 evidenc-
ing the dynamic growth of this nonprobate asset.
The use of inter vivos trusts, both of the funded and unfunded
variety, as a device for transmitting one's estate has also risen
dramatically. During the five-year period of 1968 through 1973,
the number of personal trusts held by commercial banks in-
creased by fifty percent from 520,376 to 766,337, and, their aggre-
gate asset value rose from 99 billion dollars to 146 billion dollars,'
despite the stagnation of the securities market. By way of con-
trast, the number of probate estates administered by commercial
banks and their aggregate asset value remained relatively con-
stant during this same period.' The growing importance of the
inter vivos trust as an estate planning device is due to the flexibil-
ity which it offers as a vehicle for funneling one's life insurance,
employee death benefits and other assets into an integrated dis-
positive scheme. Perhaps the principal stimulus, however, for the
growing use of trusts has been the desire to minimize federal
estate taxation. Under the current federal estate tax structure,
which has existed since the enactment of the marital deduction,,"
this objective can generally be achieved by splitting one's estate
into two trusts: a marital deduction trust and a "nonqualifying"
residuary trust."
The aforementioned nontestamentary devices usually pose no
problem when they are integrated into a carefully designed dis-
positive scheme. When, however, such devices are employed
qualified employee death benefits attributable to employer contributions and INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954 §§ 401-03 which permits an employee to defer the taxation of income on
qualified employee benefit plans. The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, ena-
bling an employed person not covered by a retirement plan to open an individual retire-
ment account, should further increase the significance of this type of nontestamentary
disposition. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 219, 408-409 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
7. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times
to 1957, 678, table 483 (1957) and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 289, table 470 (1972).
8. Bd. of Governors of Federal Revenue System, Trust Assets of Insured Commercial
Banks-1968 and Bd. of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Trust Assets of Commer-
cial Banks-1973.
9. Id. From 1968 to 1973, the estates administered by commercial banks increased from
115,008 to 125,719, while their aggregate asset value increased from 14 to 14.8 billion
dollars.
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2056. The Revenue Act of 1948 introduced the concept of
the marital deduction which has since had a dominant role in estate planning.
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haphazardly, and, as is usually the case, without proper legal ad-
vice, the resulting "do-it-yourself' estate plan can be disastrous.
The interplay of probate and nonprobate assets has caused
problems which are neither envisioned nor resolved by the Illinois
Probate Act, which has failed to keep pace with the changing
nature of the assets comprising decedents' estates and the modes
by which estates are transmitted. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the two most significant recent Illinois cases in the probate
area have grappled with the relationship of the probate estate
vis-&-vis the nonprobate estate, and in so doing have attempt-
ed to fill this legislative void. In Montgomery v. Michaels,2 the
Illinois Supreme Court examined the extent to which a surviving
spouse's right to an intestate share applies to the deceased
spouse's nonprobate assets. In Estate of Van Duser,"3 an Illinois
appellate court ruled on the manner in which the federal estate
tax should be apportioned between probate and nonprobate as-
sets of a decedent's estate.
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE'S INTEREST IN NONPROBATE ASSETS
The vulnerable financial position of a spouse who receives no
wages for her role as mother and homemaker while her husband
accumulates a separate estate through his labors has long been
recognized by the law. To accord a spouse a degree of protection
11. By using a marital deduction trust/residuary trust arrangement, a person can pre-
vent the double taxation of the estate. At death, the assets comprising the marital deduc-
tion trust are not taxed because they qualify for the marital deduction. On the death of
the spouse, the assets comprising the residuary trust escape federal estate taxation be-
cause the spouse does not have a general power of appointment over the residuary trust.
Thus, each trust is taxed only once. The same favorable tax treatment can, of course be
obtained by giving the surviving spouse the marital share outright instead of placing it in
a marital deduction trust.
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2056(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 20-2056(b)-(5) (1975). An addi-
tional fact which has added to the indigenous popularity of trusts in this state is that
Illinois courts do not exercise on-going supervision over the administration of trusts, as is
the case in many other jurisdictions. This, of course, saves expensive attorneys' fees and
reduces significantly the paperwork required of a trustee.
12. 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E. 2d 465 (1973). The assets in question were funds in a Totten
trust established by decedent. See note 38 and accompanying text infra. There is an
excellent discussion of Montgomery v. Michaels in Note, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1247 (1974).
See 62 ILL. B.J. 408 (1974); 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 775.
13. 19 111. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E. 2d 228 (1st Dist. 1974). The assets in question included
approximately $170,000 in nonprobate assets and $65,000 in probate assets.
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from total disinheritance, a variety of property rights have been
recognized, among them the rights of dower and courtesy, the
surviving spouse's award, the right of homestead, the right to
renounce a will, the right to a share of intestate assets, and in
some jurisdictions the rights inherent in community property.
Under present Illinois law, a surviving spouse has the right to
renounce the decedent spouse's will and take one-third of his
probate estate if he leaves descendants, or one-half if he leaves
no descendants. 4 A surviving spouse also has the right to retain
a homestead of $10,00011 and to receive a surviving spouse's award
of at least $5,000.'1 The rights of dower and courtesy have been
abolished. 11
Do these provisions in Illinois law accord a surviving spouse
sufficient statutory protection against a spouse bent on her disin-
heritance? The answer, in this writer's opinion, is no. What statu-
tory protection does a wife have from a husband who places his
cash in a joint tenancy savings account with his paramour, desig-
nates his children as the beneficiaries of his employee benefit
plan and life insurance policies, and transfers his securities to a
trust distributable to his Moose Lodge upon his death? Because
none of these assets form part of the probate estate, his surviving
spouse cannot reach these assets under either her statutory right
to renounce or her statutory right to an intestate share.
To remedy this injustice, Illinois courts have attempted to sup-
plement the statutory property rights of a surviving spouse
through the judicial doctrine of "transfers in fraud of marital
rights:"
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 16 (1973). The surviving spouse has the right to renounce
the will, "whether or not the will contains any provision for the benefit of the surviving
spouse .... " Id.
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § 1 (1973). The Illinois Probate Act provides, however, that
the court has the power to set off the homestead and order the sale of the property or if
the property cannot be divided, sell the property free of homestead and pay the person
entitled to the exemption the equivalent sum of money. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 234 (1973).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 178 (1973) reads in part:
The surviving spouse . . . shall be allowed . . . such a sum of money as the
court deems reasonable for the proper support of the surviving spouse for the
period of 9 months after the death of the decedent in a manner suited to the
condition in life of the surviving spouse and to the condition of the estate . . ..
The award shall in no case be less than $5,000 . . ..
17. The estates of dower and courtesy were abolished in Illinois on January 1, 1972. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 18 (1973).
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If the gift or disposition of the property, however, is but a
scheme of the husband to deprive the wife of her property rights,
at the same time retaining the benefits of the property himself
during his lifetime, the transaction may be set aside."
Some of the facts considered by the courts in determining
whether a particular transfer is a fraud upon the surviving
spouse's marital rights, are the decedent's intention, 9 the prox-
imity between the date of the transfer and the date of his death,
whether the transfer is bona fide or illusory, the fairness of the
overall dispositive scheme to the surviving spouse, and the degree
of control retained by the decedent.'" An additional but inarticu-
lated consideration is the extent and cause of any marital dishar-
mony between the decedent and the surviving spouse, i.e., was
the dispositive scheme reasonable in view of the relative fault of
the parties and the duration of their estrangement?'
There are only four reported Illinois cases in which a surviving
spouse successfully invoked the fraud of marital rights doctrine
as to post-nuptial transfers. In Blankenship v. Hall,2" Mr. Blan-
kenship conveyed substantially all of his real estate to third par-
ties. While Mrs. Blankenship was committed to an insane asylum
from 1892 through 1898, the Hall family moved in with Mr. Blan-
kenship. After Mrs. Blankenship was released, Mr. Blankenship
did not allow her to live with him, instead purchasing a separate
home for her while he continued to reside with the Hall family.
In 1903, while incurably ill, Mr. Blankenship conveyed all of his
real estate, with the exception of the real estate on which Mrs.
Blankenship's separate home was situated, to the Hall children,
reserving in himself a life estate. The court had no difficulty in
18. Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 I11. App. 393, 398-99, 26 N.E. 2d 736, 739
(1st Dist. 1940).
19. See, e.g., Deke v. Huenkemier, 289 Ill. 148, 124 N.E. 381 (1919). Although the case
dealt with an antenuptial transfer, the court held that the rights of dower, homestead,
and the widow's award would be protected against a conveyance intended to defraud a
future wife. Id. at 155, 124 N.E. at 384.
20. See Rose v. St. Louis Trust Co., 43 Ill. 2d 312, 316, 253 N.E. 2d 414, 419 (1969).
21. See, e.g., Williams v. Evans, 154 11. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895) (husband and wife had
not resided together for twenty years); Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 Ill. App.
393, 26 N.E. 2d 736 (1st Dist. 1940) (husband and wife had not resided together for over
four years).
22. 233 Ill. 116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908).
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determining the obvious purpose of the conveyances: "Plainly,
from the record, Blankenship intended to deprive his wife, so far
as he legally could, of all interest in his property."23 However, the
court permitted Mrs. Blankenship to reach the real estate only
for purposes of paying her widow's award, but inconsistently and
irreconcilably denied her an undivided one-half interest in the
real estate as her forced share on renunciation. Thus, despite the
unmistakable fraudulent intention of Mr. Blankenship, the court
refused to go further than half-way in applying the doctrine of
fraud of marital rights.
In Hamilton v. First State Bank of Willow Hills,24 Mrs. Barton
sued to recover $1,500 in certificates of deposit which her husband
had purchased one year prior to his death. The certificates were
registered in the names of Mr. Barton and his daughter in a
purported joint tenancy. After Mr. Barton purchased the certifi-
cates, only about $100 remained in his bank accounts, and upon
his death there were insufficient assets in his probate estate to
pay his debts, funeral and administration expenses, and Mrs.
Barton's widow's award of $500. The court found that the transfer
was fradulent, and permitted Mrs. Barton to reach the certifi-
cates in satisfaction of her widow's award.
Blodgett v. Blodgett, 5 involved the most egregious instance of
fraud of marital rights. After Mrs. Blodgett filed a separate main-
tenance suit against her husband, Mr. Blodgett and his brother
engaged in a scheme involving forged promissory notes purport-
edly executed by Mr. Blodgett to deprive Mrs. Blodgett of her
property rights. The fraudulent scheme was continued after Mr.
Blodgett's death by his brother. The court had little difficulty in
applying the doctrine to invalidate this scheme.
The most celebrated case in Illinois in which the doctrine of
fraud of marital rights was applied is Smith v. Northern Trust
Co.2" Mr. Smith transferred $50,000 of property, substantially all
of his estate, to a fully revocable trust. Initially his wife was
named as a beneficiary, but after marital discord developed he
amended the trust to eliminate her beneficial interest. During his
23. Id. at 122, 84 N.E. at 194.
24. 254 Ill. App. 55 (4th Dist. 1929).
25. 266 Ill. App. 517 (2d Dist. 1932).
26. 322 Il. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75 (1st Dist. 1944).
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lifetime, Mr. Smith retained the right to income and principal.
The court ruled that the trust was colorable and illusory, and held
that Mrs. Smith was entitled to reach the trust corpus both for
her widow's award and her forced share on renunciation.
The strength of the fraud of marital rights doctrine, however,
is considerably undercut by the more frequent deference to
Illinois' strong policy in favor of the free alienability of property
by a spouse:
[A] spouse in one's lifetime may dispose of his or her prop-
erty-both personal and real, and thus deprive a husband or
wife of a possible inheritance, and such deed, transfer or gift is
not vulnerable to attack unless the transaction is a sham and is
"colorable" or "illusory" and is tantamount to frand [sic].27
Illinois courts, on the whole, have been extremely reluctant to
characterize post-nuptial transfers as colorable, fraudulent or il-
lusory, and have upheld spousal transfers, even when the explicit
purpose of a transfer was to deprive one's spouse of an inheri-
tance."8
Illinois courts, for example, have ruled that the following situa-
tions comprise proper dispositions of one's estate without fraud
upon the marital rights of one's spouse: a husband's transfer of
$60,000 of promissory notes to his son in consideration for his
son's promise to pay him $2,000 per year and distribute the prom-
issory notes in a specified manner upon his death;29 a wife's trans-
fer of realty and personalty into a trust under which she retained
the right to income with the remainder to be used for religious
purposes;30 the conveyance by a husband of substantially all of his
real estate to third parties, reserving for himself a life estate;3 the
transfer by a husband, during his last illness, of $100,000 worth
27. Holmes v. Mims, 1111. 2d 274, 279, 115 N.E. 2d 790, 792-93 (1953).
28. There are numerous Illinois cases involving antenuptial transfers which are not
within the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Deke v. Huenkemeier, 260 Ill. 131, 102 N.E. 1059
(1913); Higgins v. Higgins, 219 Ill. 146, 76 N.E. 86 (1905); and Jones v. Jones, 213 Ill. 228,
72 N.E. 695 (1904).
29. Padfield v. Padfield, 78 Ill. 16 (1875).
30. Williams v. Evans, 154 Ill. 98, 39 N.E. 698 (1895).
31. Blankenship v. Hall, 233 Ill. 116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908). Although the court permitted
the surviving spouse to reach the real estate to pay her widow's award, it denied her the
right to take an interest therein as her forced share on renunciation. See text accompany-
ing notes 22-23, supra.
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of securities to a trust for the primary benefit of his grand-
daughter, with certain income rights retained by him;32 the con-
veyance by a wife of all of her real estate to a trust under which
she retained a life estate;33 a gift by a husband, while seriously
ill, of forty valuable paintings of the Art Institute of Chicago on
the understanding that he would retain possession of the paint-
ings for one year;34 a husband's conveyance of an apartment
building to his daughter and himself as joint tenants;35 and a
husband's creation of joint tenancy bank accounts with his
daughters.3" In each of these cases the public policy favoring the
financial protection of a surviving spouse yielded to the stronger
policy favoring the free alienability of a spouse's property.
The judicial doctrine of fraud of marital rights which emerges
from this tortuous line of cases is a confused, nebulous concept,
impossible to define and difficult to apply. Perhaps the only gen-
eralization which can be drawn from the cases is that the courts
tend to apply the doctrine only in situations which smack of the
most flagrant fraud, a situation such as the use of forged
promissory notes in Blodgett, or one, as in Smith, involving a
decedent's transfer of practically all his assets to an entity in
which he retains a substantial interest.3" With the exception of
these extreme circumstances, Illinois courts have been unwilling
to apply the doctrine, opting instead for the free alienability of a
spouse's property.
It was against the backdrop of this muddled case law that the
Supreme Court of Illinois reached its landmark decision in
Montgomery v. Michaels." During her lifetime, Mrs. Montgo-
mery created eight "Totten trust" bank accounts in which she
was named as trustee. Upon her death the accounts were to be
paid to her two children by an earlier marriage. After Mrs. Mont-
gomery died intestate, Dr. Montgomery filed a citation petition
in the probate court, alleging that the Totten trust accounts were
32. Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 11. App. 635 (1st Dist. 1912).
33. Patterson v. McClenthanan, 296 I1. 475, 129 N.E. 767 (1921).
34. Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E. 2d 736 (1st Dist. 1940).
35. Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 Ill. 253, 59 N.E. 2d 684 (1945).
36. Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E. 2d 850 (1962).
37. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
38. 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E. 2d 465 (1973).
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illusory and a fraud upon his marital rights. The supreme court,
in reaching its decision, completely disregarded the intention of
Mrs. Montgomery in creating the accounts, and instead focused
on the degree of control retained by her:
In the case at bar the settlor was also the trustee. During her
lifetime she retained absolute, unqualified control over the bank
accounts, and possessed and exercised all incidents of complete
ownership, including the right to receive interest payable
thereon and withdraw the principal thereof. The enjoyment of
the proceeds of the accounts by the beneficiary or beneficiaries
named therein would arise only upon the death of the settlor-
trustee with the accounts remaining intact. 9
Because of the virtually absolute control which Mrs. Montgomery
retained, the court concluded that the Totten trust accounts,
although valid transfers as to third parties, were illusory and
ineffective as to Dr. Montgomery, who could reach them both as
part of his intestate share and to pay his surviving spouse's
award. The intention of Mrs. Montgomery was immaterial to this
determination.
Whereas all prior Illinois cases dealing with fraud on marital
rights viewed the intention of the spouse as an important, if not
the paramount factor in determining whether a transfer is effec-
tive against a surviving spouse, the court in Montgomery com-
pletely discarded the fraudulent intention test. In its place, the
court applied the illusory transfer test, i.e., examining the extent
and degree of control retained over the transfexred property.
Thus, Montgomery marks a sharp departure from established
Illinois law in cases involving transfers in fraud of marital rights.
The broad terms in which the illusory transfer doctrine is
phrased in Montgomery sent immediate shock waves throughout
the Illinois estate planning community." A logical extension of
39. Id. at 536, 301 N.E. 2d at 467.
40. Under one proposal presently under consideration by the Illinois legislature, the
fraudulent intention test would be restored:
A transfer of property, in trust or otherwise, by a decedent during his lifetime
shall not, in the absence of an intent to defraud the surviving spouse of the
spouse's statutory share, be invalid, ineffective or illusory as to the surviving
spouse, whether the decedent dies testate or intestate.
H.B. 1862, 79th General Assembly (1975) (Introduced April 10, 1975).
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the illusory transfer doctrine would entitle a surviving spouse to
an intestate share or forced share on renunciation of not only
Totten trust accounts, but also of other nonprobate assets over
which the deceased spouse retained substantial control, such as
joint tenancy and payable-on-death accounts, life insurance and
most inter vivos trusts. Even in instances in which a spouse had
acted in the utmost good faith in transferring property to a non-
testamentary entity, and had otherwise provided generously for
a spouse's welfare, a spouse could play havoc with an estate plan
by invoking the illusory transfer doctrine and claiming a share of
"illusory" nonprobate assets.
Because of the element of uncertainty which Montgomery in-
jects into the estate plans of Illinois residents, particularly in light
of the growing incidence of marital disharmony in recent years,
the decision has been met with an understandably high degree of
criticism." When viewed from a proper historical perspective,
however, it is apparent that the decision was a necessary conse-
quence of the legislature's failure to update spousal property
rights in response to the changing nature of the assets comprising
a decedent's estate and the means by which they are transmit-
ted.42
Because real estate was the principal source of wealth a century
ago, it was difficult, if not impossible, to circumvent the statutory
rights of dower and renunciation and successfully disinherit a
spouse. The changing times have, however, eroded a surviving
spouse's statutory property rights to the periphery of obsoles-
cence. Due in part to the fluid nature of intangible personal prop-
erty, the principal asset of most contemporary estates and non-
testamentary dispositions of property, it had become relatively
simple to circumvent a surviving spouse's statutory property
rights. The nebulous judicial doctrine of fraud of marital rights,
which looked primarily to the fraudulent intention of a decedent,
did little to supplement these statutory property rights.
The court in Montgomery was thus faced with the painful
choice of countenancing this historical erosion of a surviving
spouse's statutory property rights or of attempting to patch the
41. See, e.g., Note, 5 LoYoLA (Chi.) L.J. 688 (1974); Note, 50 CHI-KENT L. REV. 159
(1973).
42. See notes 1-11 and accompanying text supra.
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gaping hole which the legislature had permitted to wear through
the fabric of these rights. In adopting the illusory transfer test,
the court opted for the latter. Any other ruling would have
amounted to a stark admission by the court that a surviving
spouse's property rights had for all intents and purposes become
a worthless statutory guarantee. Unfortunately, as is true in most
cases in which the judiciary engages in statutory patchwork, the
patch that the court applied did not quite cover the hole, and
gave rise to as many questions as it attempted to answer.
Since the holding in Montgomery is limited to a surviving
spouse's right to take an intestate share of Totten trust accounts,
numerous questions remain. Can a surviving spouse also reach
Totten trust accounts as part of her forced share on renunciation?
Does the Montgomery decision extend to payable-on-death bank
accounts in which the creator of the account retains the same
degree of control? Does it likewise extend to U.S. savings bonds
with a payable-on-death designation, over which the degree of
control is the same but the property rights of which are deter-
mined by federal law?43 What about a life insurance policy over
which the owner has absolute control during his lifetime, includ-
ing the power to cancel the policy and take its cash surrender
value? Does the illusory transfer doctrine encompass employee
pension benefits of which the decedent had the power to request
a lump sum distribution during his life and the power to desig-
nate a beneficiary to receive the benefits upon his death? What,
if any, inter vivos trusts are illusory transfers? DQes it hinge on
the grantor's retention of the right to amend or revoke the trust?
His reservation of income or principal rights? Or merely his re-
tention of a testamentary power of appointment? Does it make
any difference whether the grantor or some independent third
party is the trustee? Finally, has the illusory transfer test sup-
planted or merely supplemented the fraudulent intention test?
43. Any attempt by a state to modify the U.S. Treasury Regulations governing the
disposition of U.S. obligations might be invalid under the supremacy clause of the U.S.
Constitution. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) in which the Supreme Court held
that the treasury regulations creating a right of survivorship in a U.S. savings bond
preempt any inconsistent provision of Texas community property law. But see Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) which deferred to state law on a probate question; whether
an illegitimate could inherit from his natural parent, notwithstanding the apparent equal
protection violation.
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Although these questions are raised by the Montgomery deci-
sion, none can be answered by the judiciary except on a case by
case basis over an extended period of time. In all probability,
however, each new decision would provide as much confusion as
clarification, and would raise as many new issues as it attempted
to resolve. What is needed in this area is not a further judicial
patchwork of outmoded laws, but a major legislative overhauling
and updating of the statutory property rights of a surviving
spouse. The proposals in this direction range from the extremes
of adopting community property law concepts to abolishing
spousal property rights altogether.
The community property approach to spousal property rights
is, perhaps, the fairest solution in that it measures a spouse's
property rights by the duration of the marriage. Thus, the second
wife of a widower does not automatically become entitled to a
share of his separate estate-property which was accumulated
by the joint efforts of the widower and his deceased wife. Be-
cause community property is an alien concept in Illinois law, and
its adoption would be a radical departure from existing Illinois
property law, any hope that the legislature would consider, much
less enact, community property law at this time is unrealistic.
In this era of supposed sexual equality, the complete repeal of
spousal property rights has some ostensible appeal as a solution.
After all, it could be argued, haven't women now attained suffi-
cient economic and social equality so that they no longer need a
guaranteed share of their spouses' estates. Moreover, haven't sur-
vivor benefits, under the Social Security Act, which are in theory
generated by the deceased spouse's contributions, accorded ade-
quate protection to a surviving spouse to render spousal property
rights obsolete. 4 These arguments, however, overlook certain
facts: sexual equality exists in theory but not in practice: most
women continue to raise their children without pay while their
husbands provide the principal source of the family's income, and
social security benefits are grossly inadequate to maintain a com-
fortable standard of living.45
Between these extremes of adopting community property law
44. See note 2 supra.
45. The average monthly benefit available to a widowed mother in 1973 was $118.16.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 281, table 443 (1974).
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and completely abolishing spousal property rights there is a mid-
dle ground-the "augmented estate" approach, under which a
surviving spouse is given the right to take a share, by intestacy
or renunciation, of both probate and nonprobate assets. Varia-
tions on this theme have been adopted by several jurisdictions.
In New York,46 for example, a surviving spouse's statutory prop-
erty rights have been expanded to include the right to elect to
take a share of gifts causa mortis, Totten trusts and payable-on-
death accounts, joint tenancy property, and any inter vivos dispo-
sition of property in which the decedent retained a power to re-
voke or to consume, invade or dispose of the principal. 7 The state
of Pennsylvania permits a surviving spouse to reach any inter
vivos disposition over which the deceased spouse retained "a
power of appointment by will, or a power of revocation or con-
sumption over the principal . . . ."I' Life insurance and em-
ployee benefit plans are expressly excluded from the purview of
the statute. 9
The augmented estate of the Uniform Probate Code,'0 which
has been enacted by several states,5' encompasses transfers of
property over which the decedent retained the right to income,
possession or enjoyment, or the right to revoke or consume, in-
vade or dispose of principal; joint tenancy assets; and gifts within
two years of death which exceed $3,000 per donee.52 Life insur-
ance, joint annuities and pensions are not included in the Code's
augmented estate. 3
The augmented estate concept poses two difficult problems.
First, which nonprobate assets are to be included and which are
to be excluded from the augmented estate? Second, what assets
46. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §5-1.1(b)(1) (McKinney 1967).
47. Id. Expressly excluded, however, from the scope of a surviving spouse's rights are
employee benefit plans, life insurance, and U.S. Savings Bonds. Id. §5-1.1(b)(2).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §6111(6) (1975).
49. Id.
50. Joint Editorial Bd. for the Uniform Probate Code, Uniform Probate Code (1972).
51. The Uniform Probate Code has been adopted by Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota. See, e.g.,
ALASKA REV. STAT. §§ 13,06.005 et seq. (1972) and ARIZONA REV. STAT. §§ 14-1101 et seq.
(Supp. 1974).
52. Uniform Probate Code (U.L.A.) § 2-201(1).
53. Id. § 2-201(2). A transfer is also excluded, "if made with the written consent or
joinder of the surviving spouse." Id.
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are to be used to fund the surviving spouse's share?
The first problem presents the biggest stumbling block. No two
persons, it seems, can agree on what assets should comprise the
augmented estate.54 Moreover, it has been convincingly argued
that if any nonprobate asset is excluded from the augmented
estate, a person who is determined to disinherit his spouse will
be permitted to do so. Life insurance, for example, has been ex-
cluded from the augmented estates of New York, Pennsylvania
and the Uniform Probate Code. What, barring poor health, would
prevent a person from converting his estate into a large sum of
whole life insurance payable to a third person to circumvent his
spouse's rights in his augmented estate? As long as any type of
nonprobate property is exempted from the augmented estate, an
avenue exists which enables a person to successfully disinherit a
spouse.
Perhaps the simplest way to close these avenues would be to
base the augmented estate entirely on the deceased spouse's ad-
justed gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Under this
approach, the surviving spouse would be entitled to elect to take
one-third or one-half, as the case may be, of the deceased spouse's
adjusted gross estate; in effect, a marital deduction formula be-
quest. This method of determining the augmented estate is at-
tractive for a number of reasons. First, the gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes contains the most comprehensive definition
of transfers by a decedent." Second, there is a considerable exist-
ing body of law relating to the determination of what transfers are
includable in the gross estate."6 Third, the federal estate tax pro-
vides the framework for modern estate planning, and the settle-
ment of the tax is usually the most important facet of the admin-
istration of all but small estates.
There are, however, some drawbacks to relying entirely on the
54. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
55. For purposes of the federal estate tax, the definition of the gross estate is as follows:
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including
to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2031(a).
The property included in the gross estate is defined in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 2033-
2044.
56. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 2033-2044; Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2033-20.2044 (1975).
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federal estate tax to define the augmented estate. First of all,
certain types of property, such as qualified, noncontributory
employee benefit plans are excluded from the gross estate.57 Sec-
ond, a decedent who wishes to disinherit his spouse might name
as executor a third person who could attempt to limit the spouse's
share by obtaining unrealistically low valuations of property in-
cludable in the gross estate. This possibility could be dealt with
by providing that values determined for federal estate tax pur-
poses are only prima facie correct, or by entitling the surviving
spouse to an in kind rather than in value share of the estate. On
balance, however, an augmented estate based upon the gross es-
tate for federal estate tax purposes is probably the simplest and
fairest approach, and the one which makes disinheritance of one's
spouse the most difficult.
The second problem which the augmented estate concept pre-
sents is determining the manner in which the surviving spouse's
share should be funded. The Uniform Probate Code funds the
surviving spouse's elective share first with property which has
passed directly to the surviving spouse; the balance of her share
is borne prorata by the other recipients of the augmented estate.5"
This approach is conceptually at odds with Illinois law which
funds a surviving spouse's forced share on renunciation first from
the residuary estate, next from general bequests and finally from
specific bequests and devices. In the recent case of Estate of
Brinkman,5" an Illinois appellate court affirmed the principle that
upon renunciation, bequests abate by classes and not on an
"across the board" or prorata basis. The Illinois approach makes
more sense. It is more feasible to fund the spouse's forced share
with the liquid assets usually contained in the residuary estate,
than with the tangible personal property of the decedent, which
usually passes under pre-residuary bequests. The folly of funding
the surviving spouse's forced share with an undivided one-third
interest in a Picasso print or a diamond ring is readily apparent.
The Illinois method of funding a surviving spouse's elective
57. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2039(c). Charleston Nat'l Bank v. United States, 221
F.Supp. 271 (D.C.W.Va. 1963).
58. Uniform Probate Code (U.L.A.) §2-207.
59. 26 Il1. App. 3d 780, 326 N.E. 2d 167 (1st Dist. 1975). See also Lewis v. Sedwick, 223
Ill. 213, 79 N.E. 14 (1906).
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share, however, applies only to the probate estate. If the aug-
mented estate concept were adopted, a method of funding non-
probate assets would also have to be determined. Although there
are several approaches to this problem, the following appears to
be workable.
The surviving spouse's share would be satisfied first with prop-
erty which the deceased spouse had transferred to her. The bal-
ance of her share would be provided by giving her a prorata inter-
est in each nonprobate asset, and a prorata interest in the probate
estate. However, the surviving spouse's proportionate share of the
probate estate would be funded first from the residuary estate,
next from general bequests and finally from the specific bequests
and devises. Thus, the probate estate and nonprobate estate
would each abate proportionately, but within the probate estate
there would be an abatement by classes of bequests and devises.
This method of funding the augmented estate may be illus-
trated by the following example. Assume a decedent's estate con-
sists of goods and chattels worth $50,000 specifically bequeathed
to his daughter, a net residuary estate of $100,000 bequeathed to
his church, a $100,000 life insurance policy payable to his son,
and a $50,000 residence held in joint tenancy with his wife. Upon
renunciation, his wife would be entitled to one-third of the aug-
mented estate, or $100,000. This amount would be funded first
with the $50,000 residence which the decedent transferred to her
by joint tenancy. The remaining $50,000 of her share would be
borne prorata by the probate and nonprobate estate. Thus, the
surviving spouse would be entitled to $20,000 of the life insurance
and $30,000 of the probate estate. Her share of the probate estate,
however, would be borne entirely by the residuary estate; the
goods and chattels would not be abated.
In Montgomery the supreme court recognized something that
the legislature has long chosen to ignore: that a surviving spouse's
Illinois statutory property rights, within the context of modem
property concepts, are outmoded means of guaranteeing the fi-
nancial security of a surviving spouse. It is doubtful that anyone
can draft a perfect statute which will provide an absolute guaran-
tee against disinheritance. There can be no doubt, however, that
the legislature can find a satisfactory solution which will make it
extremely difficult for a person to disinherit his spouse by making
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nontestamentary dispositions of his estate which are beyond the
reach of the present spousal statutory rights.
APPORTIONMENT OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX BETWEEN PROBATE
ASSETS AND NONPROBATE ASSETS
There exists yet another area where the relationship of the
probate estate and the nonprobate estate of a decedent has re-
cently been scrutinized by Illinois courts: the manner in which
the federal estate tax should be apportioned among a decedent's
assets.0° The Internal Revenue Code imposes the federal estate
tax on the executor or administrator of the estate"' but gives little
guidance as to the manner in which it should be apportioned.
Unless the decedent's will provides otherwise, the Code gives the
personal representative a right of reimbursement from the recipi-
ents of two kinds of property for the federal estate tax attributa-
ble to such property: (1) life insurance 2 and (2) property over
which the decedent had a general power of appointment. 3 Except
as to these two categories of property, the Code leaves the appor-
tionment determination solely to state law. 4 In contrast to the
majority of states which have apportionment statutes,65 the Illi-
60. Unlike the federal estate tax, the Illinois inheritance tax is a tax on the right of a
recipient to receive property either by descent or devise and is not a tax on the decedent's
gross estate. Because the Illinois inheritance tax is assessed against the recipient of the
decedent's property and not against the personal representative, there is no problem in
apportioning the Illinois inheritance tax. The tax must be paid by the recipient unless the
decedent's will provides otherwise. See ILL.REv.STAT. ch. 120, § 375 (1973). See First Nat'l
Bank v. Hart, 315 Ill. App. 541, 43 N.E.2d 569 aff'd 383 Ill. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943); In
re Johnson's Estate, 389 Ill. 425, 59 N.E. 2d 825 (1945).
61. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2002.
62. Id. § 2206.
63. Id. § 2207.
64. See Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942), where the issue was the constitutionality
of § 124 of the New York Decedent Estate Law, which provided that except as otherwise
directed by will, the federal estate tax burden shall be apportioned among the distributees
and beneficiaries of the estate. The court said:
[Wie are of the opinion that Congress intended that the federal estate tax
should be paid out of the entire as a whole, and that the applicable state law as
to the devolution of property at death should govern the distribution of the
remainder and the ultimate impact of the federal tax; accordingly, §124 is not
in conflict with the federal estate tax.
Id. at 97-98.
65. See state apportionment statutes cited in FED. EST. & GiFr TAX REP. § 2490.16
(1974).
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nois Probate Act is silent on the subject. The apportionment of
federal estate tax has thus been a problem left to the Illinois
courts to decide.
Until the recent case of Estate of Van Duser" in 1974 the rule
in Illinois appeared to be that the residuary estate must bear the
entire federal estate tax in the absence of any contrary direction
by the testator. In 1971, for example, in Estate of Phillips,7 the
beneficiary of the residuary estate sought to challenge this judi-
cial rule and apportion the federal estate tax to a specific devise.
The decedent's will was silent as to the payment of the federal
estate tax. After several small bequests, the will devised a parcel
of real estate worth $235,200 to the decedent's stepson and the
residuary estate worth $95,000 to the decedent's sister. The fed-
eral estate tax of approximately $59,000 significantly reduced the
residuary estate to only $26,000. The sister asked the court to
require the stepson who received the specific devise to contribute
his proportionate share of the federal estate tax. The court re-
fused to do so, affirming the rule that the residue alone must bear
the tax. 8
The rule was again challenged in Estate of Van Duser,69 but
under an entirely different factual situation. Because the dece-
dent died intestate, her entire probate estate of $65,000 passed to
her sisters, Ethel and Katherine, her heirs-at-law. In addition to
her probate estate, the decedent, during her lifetime, transferred
about $170,000 of personal property into joint tenancy with her
sister Katherine and her sister's children and grandchildren. The
administrator charged the federal estate tax of $40,000 entirely to
the probate estate, decreasing it to only $25,000 while leaving
joint tenancy assets, which generated the largest part of the tax,
intact. Ethel asked the court to apply the doctrine of equitable
apportionment. Noting the unfairness of the situation, the court
required the owners of the joint tenancy property to contribute a
proportionate share of the federal estate tax:
[Slince the amount of the non-probate assets was included in
66. 19 11. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E. 2d 228 (1st Dist. 1974).
67. 1 111. App. 3d 813, 275 N.E. 2d 685 (3rd Dist. 1971).
68. Id. at 815, 275 N.E. 2d at 687.
69. 19 Il. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E. 2d 228 (1st Dist. 1974).
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the gross estate in determining the amount of federal tax liabil-
ity and thus contributed to the assessment of that tax, impelling
justice and fairness dictate, and equity provides, that the recipi-
ents of those assets contribute in paying the federal estate tax
proportionately to the amount of tax their share generated.7'
The court thus departed from the rule requiring the residue to
bear the full impact of the federal estate tax, and adopted the
doctrine of equitable apportionment.
In the wake of Van Duser, the residuary legatees in Estate of
Fairchild,7' asked the appellate court to apportion the federal
estate tax and thereby charge the beneficiary of a specific devise.
The will was silent as to the payment of the federal estate tax.
Noting Phillips, which involved virtually the same facts, the
court refused to apportion the tax.
The principle which emerges from this line of cases appears to
be that in the absence of a contrary direction by the testator, the
residuary estate will bear the entire federal estate tax attributed
to the probate estate, but that a recipient of nonprobate property
will bear that portion of the federal estate tax generated by his
property. The federal estate tax, in other words, will be appor-
tioned between probate and nonprobate property, but will not be
apportioned between the residuary estate and specific or general
bequests or devises.
The Uniform Probate Code, in contrast to the Phillips-Van
Duser-Fairchild approach, requires all assets of the probate and
nonprobate estate to bear their proportionate share of the federal
estate tax unless the decedent's will provides otherwise or unless
it would be inequitable.7" The wisdom of apportioning the tax
among specific bequests and devises, such as real estate and tang-
ible personal property, is questionable. In this respect, the Illinois
judicial doctrine of the equitable apportionment is the better
rule.
In at least one respect, however, the present Illinois apportion-
ment approach is deficient. In Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson,7" an
70. Id. at 1027, 313 N.E. 2d at 231.
71. 21 Ill. App. 3d 459, 315 N.E. 2d 658 (4th Dist. 1974).
72. Uniform Probate Code (U.L.A.) § 3-916.
73. 344 Il1. App. 508, 101 N.E. 2d 604 (1st Dist. 1951).
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Illinois appellate court ruled that a surviving spouse who ren-
ounces a will must bear one-third, or one-half as the case may be,
of the federal estate tax. The court noted that a surviving spouse
who renounces is entitled under the Probate Act to one-third of
the estate "after payment of all just claims,"" and it determined
that the federal estate tax is a "just claim." As a result, the
surviving spouse's elective share was charged with one-third of
the federal estate tax even though the entire share qualified for
the marital deduction and did not generate one penny of federal
estate tax. In addition, because a portion of the federal estate tax
is charged to the elective share, the marital deduction is corre-
spondingly reduced. This reduction of the marital deduction, in
turn increases the federal estate tax, which in turn further re-
duces the marital deduction. Anyone who has attempted to com-
pute the federal estate tax in such a situation will find himself
faced with a highly involuted, circular computation, involving
three mutually dependent unknowns, i.e., the federal estate tax,
the marital deduction and the Illinois inheritance tax. The pri-
mary beneficiary of the rule of Northern Trust is the federal gov-
ernment, which receives a greater federal estate tax.
While it may be desirable for the legislature to change the
unfortunate result of charging a surviving spouse who renounces
with one-third of the federal estate tax, the judicial doctrine of
apportionment which has emerged from the Phillips-Van
Duser-Fairchild line of cases appears to be a satisfactory ap-
proach to the problem. It would be foolhardy, however, for an
estate planner to rely entirely on the doctrine of equitable appor-
tionment to control the allocation of the federal estate tax. Every
will should contain a tax apportionment clause tailored to the
assets comprising the testator's estate and his intentions on the
payment of the tax.75
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Probate Act has not yet come to grips with the
problems posed by the changing nature of the assets comprising
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 16 (1973).
75. A. Fleming, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes in Illinois- Current Status and
Drafting Suggestions, 63 ILL. B.J. 522 (1975), contains examples of various tax apportion-
ment clauses.
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a decedent's estate and the means by which the estate is trans-
mitted. As a consequence, the Illinois courts have been forced to
find solutions to problems arising from the prevalence of nontes-
tamentary dispositions of property, and the interplay of the pro-
bate and nonprobate assets of a decedent's estate. In the case of
the apportionment of the federal estate tax between the probate
estate and nonprobate estate, the courts have formulated a satis-
factory, though incomplete, solution. In the area of a surviving
spouse's property rights, however, the courts, using the fraud of
marital rights and illusory transfer doctrines, have been unable
to breathe new life into antiquated statutes. The judiciary, which
is limited by stare decisis and its inability to rule beyond the
particular facts of the case before it, cannot be expected to update
the Illinois Probate Act. It is time that the legislature reexamine
the Probate Act in light of the changes which have affected the
administration of a decedent's estate over the past century.
